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BANKRUPTCY.

In Pennsylvania a landlord has no lien for rent on the proceeds of the sale of his tenant's leasehold when it is sold on
Landlord's execution, and such a lien is not to be implied
Lien
from a mere right to re-enter for breach of a condition of the lease. Therefore the District Court (W. D.
Penna.) decided that where the tenant;s leasehold is sold
by the trustee in bankruptcy under such circumstances, the
landlord is not a prefered creditor to the extent of his overdue rent: In Re Ruppel, 97 Fed. 778.
In In Re Higgins, 97 Fed. 775, an action against the bankrupt had been commenced two years before the bankruptcy,
but within four months previous to the filing of
Ac-rual o,
Lien
the petition an attachment was made in the same
action, upon which judgment was obtained. The District
Court (D. Ky.) held that this was an attachment within four
months previous to the filing of the petition within § 67 c of
the act, since, in effect, the attachment was a new proceeding
and not merely a continuation of the original suit.
BANKS AND BANKING.

Contrary to the rule adopted in Pennsylvania and most
states, the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirms the following
as the law of Nebraska: "A check drawn on
Cbeck as
Assignment funds in a bank is an appropriation of the amount
of the check in favor of the holder thereof,--in
of Fund
effect, an assignment of the amount of the check,-and the
holder, upon refusal of the bank to pay the same, where
such funds have not been drawn out before its presentation,
may bring an action thereon in his own name ": Henderson v.
U.. S. National Bank, 8o N. W. 898. But in this case the
court refused to apply the rule, holding that the fact that the
check was for an amount greater than the deposit, prevented
it from operating as an assignment. From a logical standpoint it is hard to see how this fact makes any difference, and
it would seem that the case of Bromleyv. Bank, 9 Phila. 522,
306
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cited with disapproval by the Nebraska Court, reaches a more
reasonable conclusion on this point, although the premise
upon which the latter case is based is clearly in opposition to
the current Pennsylvania law.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has given a reasonable
construction to the terms of withdrawal contained in a savings
bank book, although in doing so it was necessary
Terms of
to do violence to certain express words. The
Deposit in
s.vings Bank, terms of withdrawal were: "Deposits and dividends
Construction shall be drawn out only by the depositors in person, or by their written order, or by some person legally
autihorized, and only upon the production of the depositor's
b;ok, that such payments may be entered therein, and all
payments to persons who prcsent the deposit- book shall be
valid payments to discharge the bank and its officers." In
Cosgrove v. Provident Jnst, 44 Atl. 936, it was held that the
last clause of the agreement did not operate to create a separate class of persons entitled to withdraw, but only added
an additional qualification to the other three classes, viz., the
necessity to produce the deposit book; therefore a paymet
to a stranger, who presented the book and represented himself
as the depositor, did not discharge the bank.
BILLS AND NOTES.

In Murphy v. Improvement Co., 97 Fed. 722, the Circuit
Court (W. D., Ark.) decided (i) that a note "to A. or assignee"
Negotiability, is negotiable; (2) that it remains negotiable in the
set-off
hands of a holder, even though the payee has
indorsed it to the holder, "Pay to B." without further words
of negotiability; and (3)that the defence of set-off between
the original parties is not such an equity as will effect a holder
for value, even though he takes with knowledge.
CARRIERS.

It .ieems that a passenger on a sleeping-car has a right to assume that the centre aisle is unobstructed. In Levien v. Webb,
sleeping-Car 61 N. Y. Suppl. 1113, the passenger, in walking up

the aisle, which was dimly lighted, stumbled over
a valise which had been left in the aisle with the
knowledge of the defendant's porter. The Supreme Court of
New York decided that the questions of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence were properly
left to the jury.
Company,

ObstructedCar
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In view of the violent opposition to the federal courts which
has lately arisen, the question has been mooted whether or not
Congress could constitutionally abolish them altoPower of
Lagislature gether. On this point State v. Lindsay, 53 S. W.
950, is interesting since it construes a clause of the
to Abolish
Courts

constitution of Tennessee, which is similar to the

one in the Federal Constitution, viz. (Const. Tenn. Art. 2, § 2)
"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme
court and in such circuit, chancery, and other inferior courts
as the legislature shall from time to time ordain and establih."
Under this section the Supreme Court of Tennessee (Snodgrass, C. J., and Beard, J., dissenting), held that the legislature had power to abolish the existing Court of Chancery
and to confer its powers and jurisdiction upon other courts.
Whatever may be the constitutionality of general laws
framed to protect workmen against unjust exactions by their
employers, it is clear that such laws must be genPolce
Regulation eral in their operation. Thus the Court of Appeals,
Aimed atCls of Maryland very properly held that the fourteenth
amendment was violated by the Maryland statute (1898, C.
493), which applied only to railway and mining corporations,
forbidding the officers of such corporations from being interested in company stores: Luman v. Hitcden Bros. 44 At.
1051.
CORPORATIONS

The generally prevailing rule that a stockholder in an insolvent corporation cannot set off an indebtedness of the corpoSet off by ration to him in an action by the assignee to
Depositor in recover the unpaid balance of his stock, does not
insolvent

Bank

apply when the action is brought against a mere

debtor of the corporation.

The Court of Appeals

of Maryland in Colton v. Dover Loan Association, 45 Ati. 23,
accordingly decided that the maker of a note, held by an
insolvent bank, could, in an action on the note by the assignee,
set off his deposit in the bank to the limit, even though by so
doing he gained an advantage over the other depositors, who
received merely small percentages.
"The Supreme Court of the United States has declared the
law. We can but follow and obey." Such was the unwilling
ultra vires,

adoption by the Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh

Circuit) of the doctrine favored by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that a corporation, when sued on
its guarantee, is not estopped from pleading its lack of power
Estoppel
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to make the guarantee by reason of its receipt of the benefits
of the transaction: Cent. Trust Co. v. I. & L. H. R. Co., 98
Fed. 666.
COURTS.

Revised Statutes (U. S.), k 4966, provides that the proprietor
of a dramatic composition, upon which a copyright has been
Jurisdiction, issued, may recover a certain sum for each perPenal Actions formance from any person giving public performances without the consent of the proprietor. In Brady v.
Daly, 20 Sup. Ct. 63, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that an action brought under this statute was not an
action for a penalty, but merely for damages; therefore the
jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States was not
exclusive, and the action could be brought in the Circuit
Court.
Another case on this subject is Slicktenotl v. Grain Exchang-e, 99 Fed. I, where an action was brought by a disinterested person under the Illinois act of 1885 (p. 792, c. 38,
§132), providing that when money is lost by gambling, and
no action to recover it back is brought by the loser, any person may bring an action against the winner to recover treble
its value, half of the amount recovered going to the county,
The Circuit Court (N. D. Ill.) refused to assume jurisdiction,
on the ground that the remedy given amounts to a qui tam
action and is therefore penal.
In Hassardv. United States of Mexico, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 939,
the plaintiff, having a claim against Mexico, attached goods
Suit Against of the Mexican government in New York. As a
Foreign State matter of course the suit was dismissed on the
ground that the state court had no jurisdiction of an action
against a foreign state, but it is interesting to observe that the
dismissal was made upon the motion of the United States
District Attorney for New York, who had no interest in the
case, officially or otherwise, but who appeared merely as an
amicus curie.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The celebrated cigarette agitation in Tennessee appears to
continue in full force. Subsequent to the act of 1897, prohibRepeat of
iting the sale of cigarettes within the state, the
Prohibitory Legislature passed an act (1899, C. 30, § I), enumStatute by
erating certain vocations which might be carried
Implication
on only with a license, and providing for a license
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CRIMINAL LAW (Continued).
fee for the sale of cigarettes. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the latter act did not repeal by implication the
act of 1897 so as to authorize the sale of cigarettes: Blaufeld
v. State, 53 S. W. 1O9O. The court also affirmed its ruling
that cigarettes are not the subject of commerce within the
commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.
Where a statute defines the crime of rape as sexual intercourse accomplished with a female "not the wife of the perpetrator," it is essential that the indictment should
Rape,
Indictment aver that the prosecutrix is not the wife of the
defendant, and its failure to contain such an averment will render it demurrable: Parkerv. Territory, 59 Pac.
(Okla.) 9. But this rule is not applicable under the common
law or in states where the statute does not contain the above
provision.
DAMAGES.

Burgoon v. Jolmnston, 45 Atl. 65, is interesting in showing
how far a court will consider the status of the parties to a
contract in determining whether or not a stipulaLiquidated
Damages,
tion amounts to a penalty or merely a liquidation
Position of of damages. It appeared that the defendant, who
Parties
was a physician, went to the plaintiff, a specialist
on skin diseases, to be treated for a sore on the face. The
plaintift required that the defendant should, in case of a cure,
either give him a certificate of proficiency or $5,ooo; to which
the defendant assented. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
taking into consideration the fact that the defendant was a
physician himself, and therefore probably familiar with the
proper amounts for charges, decided that the $5,ooo was
liquidated damages, and not a penalty for the failure to give a
certificate, and it could, therefore, be recovered as compensation for the cure.
In Auckincloss v.fManhamttan Rsey. Co., 6o N. Y. Suppl. 792,
which was a proceeding to recover damages for injury to
plaintiff's land by reason of the erection of an
Eminent
Domain,
elevated railway upon the street in front of the
Benefit from property, a rather novel method of assessing
Railway
the damages was unsuccessfully brought forward
by the plaintiff. Instead of claiming the difference between
the values of his land, without and with the railway, he
sought to establish as the basis of his damages the sum his
property would have been worth if the railway had been built
through the neighborhood, but not directly in front of his
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property. The Supreme Court of New York, however, frustrated this ingenious attempt to utilize the rise in values attending the construction of the railroad through the neighborhood.
In an action for injury to the plaintiff's hand, the only evidence of permanent injury introduced by the plaintiff was the
Future Pain exhibition of the hand and his own testimony that
from injury,
Evidence

he occasionally had pain when he used the hand.

The trial judge charged: "You may award an
amount which should reasonably compensate the plaintiff for
the pain and suffering such as you are prepared to say he will
endure in the future within reasonable probability.'
Held,
error, by the Supreme Court of New York, on the ground
that no sufficient evidence had been submitted to the jury to
enable them to estimate whether or not there would be any
future pain, or what its duration would be: Webb v. Union
Rwy. Co., 6o N. Y. Suppl. 1087.
EVIDENCE.

In Pattersonv. Kennedy, 81 N. W. 91, an action was brought
on a judgment obtained in Ontario. The defendant having
contested the validity of the judgment on account
Proof of
Foreign
of lack of service by the Canadian court, it was
Practice
shown that the summons in the Ontario suit was
served by a minor of the age of nineteen years. The plaintiff
called a Canadian barrister, who testified that such a service was
good under the Canadian practice, but no statute or decision of
a Canadian court to this effect was produced. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota decided that the service of a legal summons had been sufficiently proved, but from the authorities
cited it would seem that there is some conflict upon this point.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

A statute of Minnesota (Gen. St. 1894, § 4769) provides
that "every male person who has attained the full age of
Prohibition of eighteen years and every female who has attained
Marriage
the age of fifteen years, is capable in law of conUnderffe,
tracting
marriage if otherwise competent." Other
Effect on
tatn
sections impose liabilities upon clergymen and
officers solemnizing the marriage of persons under
those ages. In State, ex rel. v. Lowell, 8o N. W. 877, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota decided that the above statute
did not by implication render void the marriage of persons
under the prescribed ages, therefore the father of a girl of
thirteen who had been married, had no right to restrain her
from living with her husband.
Validity of
Marriage
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HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).
In Maine the common law rule prevails that a wife cannot
sue her husband. In Weeks v. Elliott, 45 Atl. 29, the question
Claim Against was raised whether or not this rule prevented a wife
Husband's from proving a claim, on a note given to her by
Estate
her husband, against the assigned estate of the
husband. The Supreme Court of Maine decided that, since
the contract was a valid one, the mere fact that the wife was
unable to enforce it by suit did not prevent her proving against
the estate, since the reasons which caused the law to forbid
suits between husband and wife did not apply to an action,
not against the husband, but against his estate.
That the common law rules of evidence in civil actions do
not apply to cases of divorce tried by a judge is shown by
Evidence In Warner v. Warner, 44 Atl. 908. Here the Supreme Court of Maine decided that the general
Divorce
reputation of the respondent, accused of adultery,
Cases
for virtue and chastity was admissible, although such evidence
could not be received in a civil action at common law.

INSURANCE.
In Jones v. German Insurance Co., 81 N. W. 188, the Supreme Court of Iowa holds that where an insurance policy,
Standard and by its terms, expires at " 12 o'clock noon," the
SolarTime presumption is that it expires at 12 o'clock, solar
time, and the burden is upon the party alleging that standard, or railroad time is intended, to show such a general use
of standard time at the place of the execution of the policy as
will warrant the court in assuming that the parties intend that
standard time shall prevail.
In Kelly v. Cath. Mut. Ben. Asso., 61 N. Y. Suppl. 394, the
by-laws of the defendant, a mutual benefit association, proRequirement vided that no life insurance should be paid without
proof of actual death of the insured. In this case
of Proof
of Actual
the insured had disappeared for over seven years,
and the beneficiary contended that it was contrary
Death
to public policy and to the object and purpose of the association to require a greater evidence of death than that recognized by law. However, the Supreme Court of New York
decided that there was nothing to prevent the association from
requiring any particular form of proof that it chose, and that
the beneficiary could not recover.
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LIENS.

The common law rule, that the lien of a stable keeper upon
horses for their keep is lost by surrender of possession, is still
strictly enforced. Thus in Darling v. Hunt, 61
LenforKeep N. Y. Suppi. 278, the livery stable keeper acof Horse
cepted from the owner of the horse a chattel
mortgage of the horse in payment of its keep, and allowed the
owner to retain possession of the horse during the period of
the mortgage. Held, that the keeper had lost his lien.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

The Supreme Court of the United States has finally overruled its decision in Chicago, etc., Rwy Co. v. Ross, 112 U.
S. 377, in which it decided that a conductor of a
Fellow
Servants,
railroad train was not a fellow servant of the engiRaroa
neer, but that the railroad was liable, in an action
Crew
by the engineer, for the negligence of the conductor.
After explaining, distinguishing and qualifying the decision
for a number of years, the Supreme Court finally overruled it
flatly, and in NVew England R. R. Co. v. Conroy, 20 Sup. Ct.
85, decided that a brakeman was a fellow servant of the conductor of the train. Harlan, J., dissented, adhering to the
rule laid down in R. R. v. Ross.
NEGLIGENCE.

In Montgomery v. Ladjing, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 840, Freedman,
J., gives an excellent discussion regarding the liability of
Lability for restaurant keepers for articles lost by their guests.
Article Lost in Following the weight of authority, he decided
Restaurant that the restaurant keeper does not occupy the
position of an innkeeper, or even of a bailee, unless the
custody of the articles is given to his servants; therefore
where a man on entering a restaurant hung his overcoat on a
hook near him, from which it was stolen while he was dining,
it was held that he could not recover from the restaurant
keeper in the absence of proof of negligence by the latter.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In Kiersteadv. Bennett, 45 AtI. 42, suit was brought against
the maker of the following promissory note: "I, in my
Promise in
Official

Capacity

official capacity as treasurer of the Danforth Trotting Park Association, promise to pay, etc.
[signed] Horace A. Bennett, Treas." The Su-

preme Court of Maine, intimated that this was a personal
undertaking of Bennett to pay the amount, but it was
unnecessary to decide the question, since the association was
unincorporated.
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QUASI CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan holds that the plaintiff may
waive a tortand sue in assumpsit only (i)where the defendant has
Waiver of converted property of the plaintiff or (2) where the
Tort
defendant holds property of the plaintiff by virtue
of contract relations with the plaintiff. In St. John v. Iron Co.,
80 N. W. (Mich.) 998, it was therefore held that where a third
had converted the plaintiff's property and had sold it to the
defendant, the plaintiff could not sue the defendant in assumpsit,
but was relegated to his action of trover. There does not
seem to be much reason for this very fine distinction in regard
to the waiver of tort, and the case would probably hot be followed in all jurisdictions.
REAL PROPERTY.

In Smith v. James, 54 S. W. 4I, the Court of Civil Appeals

of Texas held that the rule that possession under an unreunrecorded corded deed is constructive notice of the grantee's
Deed,
title, was not varied by the fact that, previous to
Notice
the deed, the grantee had occupied the premises
as a tenant of the grantor, and there was consequently no
change of possession under the dved.
SURETYSHIP.

Where a surety on a written instrument agrees in writing
to ratify all " extensions" of time of payment and to be reExtension," sponsible as if no extension had been allowed,

Payment such an agreement covers only actual extensions
resting upon positive agreements between the creditor and the
debtor, and it does not render the surety liable on an extension of time implied from the fact that the creditor receives
interest from the debtor subsequent to the maturity of the
instrument: Bank v. Thomson, 59 Pac. (Kas.) 178.
TRIAL.

It is generally held that it is within the discretion of the
trial court in cases of personal injury to order the plaintiff to
Physical submit to a physical examination by the defend"xamination
ant's physicians. In Wittenberg v. Ousgard, 81
of Plaintiff, N. W. 14, the defendant demanded that the plainRontgen Rays tiff should allow the region of his injury to be
photographed by means of the Rcentgen rays. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that the lower court had properly
exercised its discretion in refusing the application, since 'the
Rcentgen rays have not become so thoroughly recognized by
science that a court can take judicial notice of the fact that
they can be employed without injury to the subject.

